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Previous research into emotion and time perception has been designed to study the
time perception of emotional events themselves (e.g., facial expression). Our aim was
to investigate the effect of emotions per se on the subsequent time judgment of a neu-
tral, non-affective event. In the present study, the participants were presented with ﬁlms
inducing a speciﬁc mood and were subsequently given a temporal bisection task. More
precisely, the participants were given two temporal bisection tasks, one before and the
other after viewing the emotional ﬁlm.Three emotional ﬁlmswere tested: one eliciting fear,
another sadness, and a neutral control ﬁlm. In addition, the direct mood experience was
assessed using the Brief Mood Introspective Scale that was administered to the partici-
pants at the beginning and the end of the session.The results showed that the perception
of time did not change after viewing either the neutral control ﬁlms or the sad ﬁlms although
the participants reported being sadder and less aroused after than before watching the sad
ﬁlm clips. In contrast, the stimulus durations were judged longer after than before viewing
the frightening ﬁlms that were judged to increase the emotion of fear and arousal level.
In combination with ﬁndings from previous studies, our data suggest that the selective
lengthening effect after watching frightening ﬁlms was mediated by an effect of arousal on
the speed of the internal clock system.
Keywords: time perception, timing, emotion, mood, fear, sadness
INTRODUCTION
In everyday life, the experience of a mood changes our relationship
with time. When we are sad and depressed we have the feeling that
the ﬂow of time slows down. Every hour seems like an eternity,
as if time had stopped. In contrast, the feeling of stress seems to
accelerate the ﬂow of time. One hour seems nothing. Although
these mood-related ﬂuctuations in our experience of time have
often been described, they have rarely been experimentally stud-
ied. Finally, we do not know whether these explicit judgments
concerning the passage of time correspond to a reality experienced
in our bodies or brains.
It may seem strange to speak about the reality of time
since humans are not equipped with any speciﬁc sensory recep-
tor enabling them to capture temporal information (for recent
reviews, see Coull et al., 2011; Van Wassenhove et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, the brain is inherently capable of processing time.
Whatever the model of the temporal neural machinery (e.g., oscil-
lators, climbing neurons, pulses), the subjective duration of events
is thought to be based on cerebral units accumulated in time (e.g.,
Durstewitz, 2004; Matell and Meck, 2004; Karmarkar and Buono-
mano, 2007). Researchers have therefore posited the existence of
an internal clock-like system that provides the raw material for
the representation of time. According to the analogical internal
clock models (Treisman, 1963; Gibbon et al., 1984), this clock
consists of a pacemaker and an accumulator. At the beginning of
the stimulus to be timed, a switch controlled by attention closes,
and the pulses emitted by the pacemaker ﬂow into the accumu-
lator. The subjective duration thus depends on the number of
pulses accumulated. When more pulses are accumulated, time is
judged to be longer. Two main mechanisms have therefore been
suggested to account for ﬂuctuations in the passage of time: (1)
an attention-based mechanism and (2) an arousal-based mech-
anism (Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007; Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009).
In the case of the ﬁrst mechanism, when attention is distracted
away from the processing of time, the switch connecting the
pacemaker to the accumulator opens, and some pulses are lost.
The duration is therefore judged relatively shorter because fewer
pulses have been accumulated. A shortening effect is therefore
observed as the amount of attention devoted to time decreases.
In the case of the second mechanism, a lengthening rather than
a shortening effect occurs. When the level of arousal increases,
the pacemaker is thought to speed up in line with the physio-
logical activation of the organism. More pulses are emitted and
the duration is judged longer. The mathematics underpinning the
internal clock models predicts that the attention-based mecha-
nism would result in an additive effect, with an attentional effect
on switch closure latency that remains constant whatever the
length of the stimulus duration. In contrast, the arousal-based
speeding-up of the internal clock would result in a multiplica-
tive effect accompanied by a lengthening effect that is relatively
greater for long than for shorter stimulus durations (Penton-
Voak et al., 1996; Penney et al., 2000; Droit-Volet and Wearden,
2002). This has been veriﬁed in experiments which have used at
least two different duration ranges (a short and a longer one)
and manipulated the level of dopamine in the brain through
the administration of psychostimulant drugs (methamphetamine,
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cocaine, caffeine; e.g.,Maricq et al., 1981;Meck, 1983; Rammsayer,
1989, 2009).
As of some 10 years ago, researchers started to systematically
investigate the mechanisms involved in the time distortions that
are seen to occur in the presence of emotions. Unlike the pio-
neering psychologists who invented original situations without,
however, perfectly controlling the emotional environment (e.g.,
Falk and Bindra, 1954; Langer et al., 1961; Thayer and Schiff,
1975), these researchers have used material taken from tested, val-
idated databases of normative stimuli to elicit emotions in the
laboratory (Coan and Allen, 2007). Studies of the perception of
time have used images from the well-known International Affec-
tive Picture System (IAPS; Angrilli et al., 1997; Lang et al., 2008;
Grommet et al., 2010). Pouthas and her collaborators also used
sounds from the International Affective Digital Sounds (IADS;
Bradley and Lang, 1999; Noulhiane et al., 2007; Mella et al.,
2011). In our laboratory, we have mainly used emotional facial
expressions (Droit-Volet et al., 2004; Effron et al., 2006; Gil et al.,
2007; Gil and Droit-Volet, 2011a,b), which have since been used
by other researchers (Tipples, 2008, 2011; Bar-Haim et al., 2009;
Doi and Shinohara, 2009; Lee et al., 2011). These studies using
different emotional stimuli have systematically shown that the
presentation duration of negative high-arousing emotional stim-
uli was judged longer than that of neutral control stimuli. They
thus logically explained this lengthening effect in terms of these
emotional stimuli that physiologically activated the central ner-
vous system, and accelerated the mechanisms which underpin the
internal clock.
However, these different studies have investigated the judgment
of the presentation duration of emotional stimuli rather than the
effect of emotional states (mood) per se on the perception of time,
i.e., on the perception of the duration of a neutral, non-affective
stimulus. In the case of the processing of emotional stimuli, the
non-temporal characteristics of the stimuli might interfere with
the processing of time. As far as emotional sounds are concerned,
the parameters of sounds (melodic contour, tempo, loudness, etc.)
have been shown to affect the perception of time irrespective of
their emotional dimension. For example, when listening to a piece
of music, a feeling of happiness is inducedwhen themusic is played
at a fast tempo in a major key compared to the feeling a sadness
that results from hearing the music played at a slow tempo in a
minor key (Peretz et al., 1998). Tempo is thus a critical factor inﬂu-
encing the experience of emotion. More speciﬁcally, when tempo
is controlled, no effect of emotional valence on the perception of
time is observed (Droit-Volet et al., 2010a). It is therefore difﬁcult,
on the basis of the temporal judgments, to distinguish between
what is produced by the elicited emotion and the non-temporal
characteristics of sound since the two are closely interlinked. This
methodological problem is reduced in the case of emotional visual
stimuli, or at least in the case of facial expressions. An angry face
is indeed a threatening stimulus which in itself automatically acti-
vates the speciﬁc fear system related to defensive mechanisms that
have their roots in human evolutionary history (Darwin, 1998;
Ohman and Mineka, 2001). Recently, Tipples (2011) found that
the magnitude of the overestimation of the presentation duration
of angry faces depends on the level of threat experienced by indi-
viduals. However, the problem is that the arousal effect produced
by the perceptionof an image of angry face is rapid and short-lived.
The biological process of activation therefore occurs very quickly.
In a temporal reproduction task, Bar-Haim et al. (2009) showed
that the signiﬁcant temporal overestimation of fearful faces disap-
peared after 2 s,“as if time perception returns to its baseline state.”
In these experimental conditions, it is therefore difﬁcult to verify
the existence of a multiplicative effect which would support the
clock speed hypothesis but would require the use of two duration
ranges, one longer than the other, in order to be tested.
The emotional stimuli used in the studies described above
therefore have only a limited ability to produce intense forms of
emotion which persist over time, with the result that it is only
possible to study the effects of emotion on the perception of very
short durations. The only studies that have elicited intense, long-
lived emotions are probably the animal-based studies that have
used fear conditioning paradigms based on the administration of
electric shocks (e.g., Meck, 1983; Meck and MacDonald, 2007).
In the experiment conducted by Meck (1983) using the temporal
bisection task, rats were initially trained to discriminate between
a short and a long anchor stimulus duration. They were then
tested with probe durations (intermediate or similar values) in
a footshock and a no-footshock condition. The results showed
that the rats responded “long” more often in the footshock con-
dition than in the no-footshock control condition, thus shifting
the psychometric function toward the left and lowering the point
of subjective equality (bisection point, BP). The BP is the stim-
ulus duration judged to be long and short with equal frequency
(proportion of long responses equal to 0.50). Meck (1983) there-
fore concluded that the footshock stress increased the speed of
the animals’ internal clock. In a recent study conducted among
human adults, Droit-Volet et al. (2010b) employed a similar bisec-
tion task with an aversive sound (a 50-ms burst of 95 dB white
noise with instantaneous rise time) heard at the end of the stim-
ulus (blue circle) to be estimated. The emotional effects of this
sound had already been tested in the participants on the basis of
self-reports and electrophysiological measures (skin conductance
response). In line with Meck’s results, the authors found that the
participants responded more often “long,” with a leftward shift of
the psychometric function and a lower BP value, on the trials in
which the participants expected the aversive sound at the end of
the stimulus duration compared to trials in which they expected
either a non-aversive sound or no sound. This experiment thus
clearly conﬁrms that, in the same way as in animals, fear distorts
time perception in human adults by inducing a lengthening effect.
This ﬁnding is entirely consistent with the works on fear showing
that threatening stimuli elicit fear reactions which automatically
trigger a wide variety of behavioral and physiological responses
(heart rate, muscle contraction), because the organism must be
prepared to react as fast as possible for its survival (LeDoux, 2000;
Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Delgado et al., 2006; Phelps, 2006). One
of the bodily changes observed in reaction to fear thus consists
of a speeding-up of the internal clock (Droit-Volet et al., 2010).
However, in these studies, the time distortions were the result of
reactions to a detected or expected threatening stimulus which
interfered with the processing of time and not the result of the
effect of a diffuse emotional state on time judgments in a neutral
situation devoid of emotional stimuli.
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The originality of the present study therefore lies in the attempt
to examine the effect of mood experience on participants’ sub-
sequent time judgment of neutral events. We used an emotion
elicitation technique that had not previously been employed in
studies of time perception, namely emotional ﬁlm clips. We used
three types of ﬁlms from the recent database of ﬁlms validated
by Schaefer et al. (2011): ﬁlms eliciting fear (1) or sadness (2)
and neutral control ﬁlms (3). The selected emotional ﬁlms were
used because they both elicit negative emotions. However, one
was high-arousing (frightening ﬁlm) and the other low-arousing
(sad ﬁlm; Izard, 1991). Before and after the presentation of the
ﬁlms, the participants performed a bisection task. The bisection
task administered before the ﬁlm was designed to provide base-
line values. Two duration ranges (200/800 and 400/1600 ms) were
used in order to try to identify the mechanisms underlying the
effect of emotion on time perception (arousal/multiplicative effect
or attention/additive effect) In addition, each participant’s mood
was assessed at the beginning and the end of each experimen-
tal session to identify changes in the mood experience produced
by the ﬁlm and verify whether their mood had dissipated. Our
assumption was that after viewing a ﬁlm, the perception of time
would not change when the ﬁlm was neutral. By contrast, stimulus
durations would be judged longer (leftward shift of psychomet-
ric function and lower BP) after than before the high-arousing,
fear-inducing ﬁlm, and shorter (rightward shift of psychometric
function and higher BP) after than before the sadness-inducing
ﬁlm that decreases the arousal level.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-ﬁve psychology students (Mean age= 19.46, SD= 1.31, 40
women and 5 men) participated in order to fulﬁll a course require-
ment and signed a written consent form as required by the
Clermont-Ferrand Sud-EstVI Statutory Ethics Committee (CPP).
MATERIALS
The experiment took place in an isolated room at Blaise Pascal
University. The participants were seated in front a PC, with a
17′′ screen, that controlled the experimental events via E-prime
software. Two loudspeakers were placed on either side of the com-
puter. The stimulus to be timed was always a blue circle presented
in the center of the computer screen. The response (long or short)
consisted of pressing the “S” and “L” keys of the computer key-
board. The ﬁlms consisted of excerpts taken from the Schaefer
et al. (2011) validated database of emotional ﬁlms. The ﬁlms were
selected as a function of the discrete emotion elicited (fear, sad-
ness, neutrality) and the intensity of this emotion. The ﬁlm clips
were: The Blair (No. 55, code 65), Scream 1 (No. 16, code 26),
and Shining (No. 28, code 38) for the emotion of fear; City of
Angels (No. 36, code 46), Philadelphia (No. 62, code 72), and
Dangerous Mind (No. 52 code 62), for sadness; and four excerpts
of TV weather news and four excerpts of stock market news for
the neutral condition. In each emotional condition, two differ-
ent sequences of ﬁlm clips were created to form a sequence of
9 min in length. The direct experience of mood produced in the
participants by viewing these ﬁlms was assessed using the French
version of the Brief Mood Introspective Scale (BMIS; Mayer and
Gaschke, 1988) with 18 mood-adjective scales (e.g., calm/calme,
nervous/nerveux, aroused/excité, sad/triste, happy/joyeux, fright-
ened/apeuré)(Niedenthal and Dalle, 2001). In the BMIS, the par-
ticipants rated the intensity of their experience of each of themood
adjectives on a 4-point scale: (XX) deﬁnitely do not feel, (X) do
not feel, (V) slightly feel, and (VV) deﬁnitely feel.
PROCEDURE
The participants were assigned to one of two duration conditions:
200/800 or 400/1600-ms. In the 200/800 condition, the short (S)
anchor stimulus duration was 200 ms and the long (L) anchor
stimulus duration 800 ms. The probe durations were 200, 300, 400,
500, 600, 700, and 800 ms. In the 400/1600-ms, S and L were 400
and 1600 ms and the probe durations 400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200,
1400, and 1600 ms. In each duration condition, the participants
completed three emotion sessions as a function of ﬁlm content
(fear, sad,neutral). The sessionswere presentedwith anew random
order for each participant, with a 15-min inter-session interval
during which the participants were free to leave the experimental
room.
Each session consisted of two bisection tasks, a baseline bisec-
tion task given before ﬁlm presentation (pre-ﬁlm), which was
followed by a test bisection task administered after ﬁlm presen-
tation (post-ﬁlm). In the bisection task performed before the ﬁlm,
the participants were ﬁrst presented with S and L once. They then
performed the bisection task with eight blocks of seven trials (56
trials), with one trial being administered for each probe duration.
For each probe duration, they therefore had to indicate whether it
was more similar to S or to L by pressing the corresponding but-
ton. The durations within each block were presented randomly.
The inter-trial interval was also randomly chosen between 500
and 1500 ms. The participants started the trial after the word
“ready/prêt” was presented, immediately followed by a 200-ms
interval and then the stimulus to be timed (blue circle). The proce-
dure used for the post-ﬁlm bisection task was exactly the same as
that used in the pre-ﬁlm bisection task, except that it was divided
into two series of four blocks of trials, with emotional ﬁlms being
presented for 9 min before each series of blocks. In addition, the
participants completed the BMIS at the start and end of each
session, i.e., before and after viewing the emotional ﬁlms.
RESULTS
ASSESSMENT OF EMOTIONS
Table 1 presents the mean mood ratings expressed by the par-
ticipants on the 4-point scales for the 18 adjectives of the BMIS
that was completed just before the pre-ﬁlm bisection task and
after the post-ﬁlm bisection task. For each emotional condition
taken separately, viewing the emotional ﬁlms signiﬁcantly changed
the participants’ mood as indicated by the overall ANOVAs on
mood experience ratings with mood adjectives and the bisec-
tion task (before vs. after the ﬁlm) as within-subjects factors.
There was indeed a signiﬁcant interaction between the mood
adjectives and the bisection phases in each emotional condition
[Fear, F(17, 748)= 19.74, Sadness, F(17, 748)= 15.52, and Neu-
tral, F(17, 748)= 8.19, p< 0.05]. As shown in Table 1, in the fear
condition, the participants felt less calm and more aroused or
nervous after than before watching frightening movies [paired
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Table 1 | Mean rate (M) and SEM of experienced mood on 4-point scales for 18 mood adjectives of the French version of the Brief Mood
Introspective Scale (BMIS) given before and after the film, for each emotional content of the films (fear, sadness, and neutral).
Fear Sadness Neutral
Before After Before After Before After
M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM M SEM
Lively 2.44 0.12 2.42 0.13 2.49 0.14 2.07** 0.13 2.53 0.13 2.09** 0.13
Happy 2.78 0.11 2.44** 0.11 2.87 0.12 2.4** 0.10 2.84 0.12 2.6** 0.12
Sad 1.47 0.10 1.67 0.10 1.36 0.08 2.38** 0.13 1.53 0.10 1.36 0.09
Tired 2.51 0.13 2.4 0.14 2.4 0.14 2.53 0.14 2.42 0.14 2.78* 0.13
Caring 2.47 0.12 2.42 0.12 2.51 0.11 2.31* 0.12 2.6 0.11 2.4* 0.12
Content 2.76 0.12 2.22** 0.11 2.78 0.12 2.24** 0.12 2.8 0.12 2.69 0.13
Gloomy 1.4 0.11 1.58 0.12 1.31 0.09 2** 0.13 1.53 0.12 1.51 0.11
Aroused 1.58 0.09 1.96** 0.13 1.78 0.10 1.31** 0.07 1.62 0.12 1.53 0.11
Drowsy 1.96 0.14 1.6* 0.11 1.87 0.14 2.04 0.14 1.93 0.14 2.56** 0.14
Grouchy 1.29 0.07 1.49 0.11 1.24 0.08 1.2 0.07 1.29 0.08 1.4 0.10
Peppy 2.16 0.14 2.36 0.14 2.2 0.14 1.87** 0.14 2.27 0.15 1.78** 0.10
Nervous 1.49 0.10 2.31** 0.15 1.58 0.12 1.49 0.11 1.59 0.11 1.42 0.10
Calm 3.27 0.11 1.82** 0.11 3.13 0.12 3.11 0.11 2.98 0.12 3.07 0.12
Loving 2.62 0.14 2.16** 0.14 2.58 0.14 2.53 0.13 2.58 0.14 2.31* 0.15
Fedup 1.4 0.10 1.73 0.14 1.47 0.13 1.4 0.11 1.38 0.10 1.96** 0.15
Active 1.96 0.12 2.29* 0.12 2.11 0.12 1.78** 0.11 1.87 0.13 1.67* 0.11
Worried 1.31 0.10 2.09** 0.13 1.38 0.10 1.58* 0.11 1.44 0.10 1.29* 0.08
Frightened 1.11 0.05 2.22** 0.14 1.09 0.04 1.18 0.07 1.09 0.07 1.14 0.03
*Difference between the base line and the test signiﬁcant at p<05, and ** at p<0.01.
sample t -test, t (44)= 9.57, t (44)= 2.78, t (44)= 5.144, respec-
tively, all p< 0.05]. They also reported being more frightened
and worried [t (44)= 7.77, t (44)= 5.48, p< 0.05]. Watching sad
ﬁlms also caused the participants to feel sadder and gloomier
and less happy [t (44)= 8.17, t (44)= 6.05, t (44)= 5.72,p< 0.05].
This also reduced the feeling of arousal [t (44)= 3.32, p< 0.05],
although the participants reported that they remained calm
between the two bisection tasks [t (44)= 0.19, p> 0.05]. Neutral
ﬁlms also changed the individuals’ moods. However, it affected
neither the arousal and calmness dimensions [t (44)= 0.68,
t (44)= 0.71, p> 0.05], nor the speciﬁc emotions of fear and sad-
ness [t (44)= 1.21, t (44)= 1.83, p> 0.05]. It simply made the
participants feelmore tired, less lively and less happy [t (44)= 3.08,
t (44)= 3.67, t (44)= 2.88, respectively, p< 0.05]. In other words,
they were more dispirited when they completed their reports,
t (44)= 3.83, p< 0.05. In sum, watching the emotional ﬁlms
elicited the expected discrete emotions, i.e., fear and sadness, in
the participants. These emotions were associated with an increase
and a decrease in arousal level respectively, although the magni-
tude of the difference in arousal between the pre- and post-ﬁlm
bisection tasks was larger for the frightening ﬁlms.
TEMPORAL BISECTION
For each emotional condition (fear, sadness, neutral), the psy-
chometric functions were represented by plotting the proportion
of long responses [p(long)] against the comparison durations in
the 200/800 and the 400/1600-ms duration range for the two
bisection tasks, i.e., before and after the presentation of the ﬁlms
(Figures 1–3). To account for the leftward or the rightward shift
FIGURE 1 | Psychometric function for fear. Proportion of long responses
plotted against probe durations (ms) for the bisection task before and after
viewing the frightening ﬁlms in the 200/400 and the 800/1600-ms duration
range.
of the psychometric function for the post-ﬁlm bisection task com-
pared to that for the pre-ﬁlm bisection task, we calculated the BP.
As reported in introduction, the BP is the point of subjective equal-
ity, [t (p(long)= 0.50]. A decrease in the BP value reveals a time
distortion in the form of a lengthening effect which is consistent
with a leftward shift of the psychometric function. In contrast, an
increase in the BP indicates a shortening effect associated with a
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FIGURE 2 | Psychometric function for sadness. Proportion of long
responses plotted against probe durations (ms) for the bisection task
before and after viewing the sad ﬁlms in the 200/400 and the 800/1600-ms
duration range.
FIGURE 3 | Psychometric function for neutral. Proportion of long
responses plotted against comparison durations (ms) for the bisection task
before and after viewing the neutral ﬁlms in the 200/400 and the
800/1600-ms duration range.
rightward shift of the psychometric function. This measures was
derived from the slope and intercept parameters obtained by ﬁt-
ting a logistic function to the individual subject data. In the case
of one participant, the ﬁt was not signiﬁcant in any emotional
condition, and it was not signiﬁcant in one of the three conditions
for three other participants. The results for these participants were
therefore excluded from the subsequent analyses. Table 2 presents
the BP obtained in this way.
An initial omnibus ANOVA was performed on the BP with
duration range as between-subjects factor (200/800 vs. 400/1600)
and two within-subjects factors: (1) the bisection task (pre-
and post-ﬁlm) and (2) the emotion (fear, sadness, neutral). The
Table 2 | Mean (M) and SEM for bisection point (BP) andWeber ratio
(WR) for the films inducing fear and sadness as well as for the neutral
films before and after viewing the films.
Fear
BP WR
M SEM M SEM
200/800
Pre-ﬁlm 494 34 0.20 0.05
Post-ﬁlm 446 35 0.14 0.03
400/1600
Pre-ﬁlm 1045 38 0.17 0.05
Post-ﬁlm 910 39 0.17 0.03
Sadness
BP WR
M SD M SD
200/800
Pre-ﬁlm 499 27 0.14 0.03
Post-ﬁlm 481 31 0.16 0.03
400/1600
Pre-ﬁlm 996 31 0.12 0.03
Post-ﬁlm 964 37 0.12 0.03
Neutral
BP WR
M SD M SD
200/800
Pre-ﬁlm 483 25 0.15 0.02
Post-ﬁlm 462 28 0.14 0.03
400/1600
Pre-ﬁlm 949 28 0.15 0.02
Post-ﬁlm 918 31 0.20 0.03
ANOVAs on p(long) are not presented because the results were
similar to those found for the BP. The ANOVA on the BP sug-
gested the presence of time distortions as a function of task,
i.e., pre- or post-ﬁlm, and emotion. Indeed, there was a signiﬁ-
cant interaction between the timing of the task and the emotion,
F(2, 80)= 3.24, p< 0.05,which subsumed a signiﬁcant task effect,
F(1, 40)= 13.91, p< 0.05, and no signiﬁcant emotion effect, F(2,
80)= 0.63, p> 0.05. The effect of duration range was also sig-
niﬁcant, F(1, 40)= 228.99, p< 0.05, but duration range did not
interact with any other factors (all p> 0.05). In the case of the
pre-ﬁlm bisection task, no signiﬁcant effect of emotion, F(2,
82)= 1.19, p> 0.05, was found, thus indicating that there were
no differences between the emotion conditions before the partic-
ipants viewed the ﬁlms. Consequently, to examine how the mood
induced by a type of ﬁlm modiﬁes time perception, we com-
pared the bisection performance before the ﬁlm with that after
the ﬁlm for each emotional ﬁlm taken separately. To do this we
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ran an ANOVA on the BP with task time as within-subjects factor
and duration range as a between-subjects factor for each type of
emotional induction.
For the fear-inducing ﬁlm (Figure 1), there was a clear left-
ward shift of the psychometric function after the ﬁlm compared
to the psychometric function before the ﬁlm. This suggests that
the comparison durations were judged longer after the partici-
pants had watched fear-inducing ﬁlms that increased their arousal
levels as the BMIS scores indicated. In line with this leftward shift
of the psychometric functions, the ANOVA on the BP showed a
signiﬁcant main effect of task, F(1, 41)= 20.05, p< 0.05, indicat-
ing that the BP was lower after than before the frightening ﬁlm
(Table 2). There was also a signiﬁcant task × duration interaction,
F(1,41)= 4.55,p< 0.05,which subsumed a signiﬁcantmain effect
of duration, F(1, 41)= 110.75, p< 0.05. For each duration range,
the BP was indeed lower after than before the ﬁlm [200/400, F(1,
23)= 9.55; 800/1600, F(1, 18)= 10.52, both p< 0.05]. The probe
durationswere thus judged longer after the frightening ﬁlms,when
the participants had experienced fear and were more aroused or
nervous. In line with this suggestion, for the post-ﬁlm bisection
task, there was a signiﬁcant correlation between the BP value and
the subjective individual feeling of being more nervous/nerveux
after viewing the frightening ﬁlms (R = 0.32, p< 0.05): The more
nervous the participants reported being in the BMIS after the ﬁlm,
the smaller their BP value was. The correlation between the BP
value and the aroused/excité adjective did not reach signiﬁcance,
probably related to the French word “excité” that did not ver-
bally describe as well as the word “nerveux” the subjective mood
experienced by the participants after viewing a frightening ﬁlm.
In addition, and in accordance with the hypothesis of a clock rate
mechanism (multiplicative effect), the magnitude of the difference
in the BPs between the pre-ﬁlm and post-ﬁlm bisection tasks was
larger for the long than for the shorter duration range. When we
calculated the difference in the BPs between these two bisection
tasks, the one-way ANOVA did indeed reveal a signiﬁcant effect of
duration that indicates that the task-related differencewas larger in
the 400/1600 than in the 200/800-ms duration condition [133.65
vs. 43.38, F(1, 41)= 4.55, p< 0.05].
With regard to the sad ﬁlm clips, the assessment of mood expe-
rience using the BMIS suggested that these ﬁlms did indeed induce
sadness in the participants and reduce their arousal level. However,
as Figure 2 suggests, this change in mood did not signiﬁcantly
modify the participants’ time perception. The ANOVA on the BP
found neither a signiﬁcant effect of task, F(1, 41)= 2.08, p> 0.05,
nor any signiﬁcant task× duration interaction, F(1, 41)= 0.09,
p> 0.05. There was only a signiﬁcant main effect of duration, F(1,
41)= 163.72,p< 0.05, thus indicating that theBPvaluewas higher
in the 400/1600 than in the 200/800-ms duration condition.
As expected, for the neutral ﬁlms, the psychometric functions
obtained after the neutral ﬁlms were also similar to those obtained
before the neutral ﬁlms (Figure 3). Consequently, the effect of
task on the BP was not signiﬁcant [F(1, 41)= 2.08, p> 0.05],
and neither was the effect of the task× duration interaction [F(1,
41)= 1.44, p> 0.05]. There was only a signiﬁcant main effect of
duration for the BP, F(1, 41)= 163.72, p> 0.05.
We performed the same analyses on the Weber ratio (WR;
Table 2),which is an index of sensitivity to time. It is theDifference
Limen [t (p(long)= 0.75 – t (p(long)= 0.25)/2] divided by the BP.
A high WR value indicates that participants’ temporal discrimi-
nation varies and that they ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to discriminate
between two durations. The omnibus ANOVA on the WR did
not show any signiﬁcant effect (all p> 0.05). This is veriﬁed in
the ANOVA conducted for the sad ﬁlm [task, F(1, 41)= 0.06,
duration, F(1, 41)= 1.29, task× duration, F(1, 41)= 0.057, all
p> 0.05] and for the neutral ﬁlm [task, F(1, 41)= 1.11, duration,
F(1, 41)= 1.05, task× duration F(1, 41)= 1.44, all p> 0.05]. This
indicates that Weber’s Law continued to hold and that the sensi-
tivity to time did not vary after viewing the neutral ﬁlm and the
sad ﬁlms despite the reduction in arousal reported in the BMIS
questions for the sadness.
For the fear-inducing ﬁlm, in line with the general ANOVA,
the ANOVA on the WR showed neither a signiﬁcant main effect of
emotion,F(1, 41)= 1.11, p> 0.05, or of duration,F(1, 41)= 0.02,
p> 0.05, nor any signiﬁcant emotion× duration interaction, F(1,
41) = 1.12, p> 0.05. This suggests that the scalar property of time
continued to apply, with a constant WR being observed across
the different durations. However, for the frightening ﬁlm asso-
ciated with a leftward shift of the psychometric function, this
also conﬁrms that the leftward shift of the psychometric func-
tions in response to fear was proportional (multiplicative) rather
than absolute (additive) in nature. This proportional shift was con-
ﬁrmedby the good superimposition of the psychometric functions
when plotted on a relative scale by dividing the probe durations by
the mean group BP (Figure 4). Overall, these different results sug-
gest that, in the present experiment which used emotional ﬁlms,
the internal clock system ran faster when the participants expe-
rienced a fearful and arousing mood that caused the stimulus
durations to be judged longer.
DISCUSSION
The originality of the present study lies in the fact that it attempts
to investigate the effect of mood experience on the time percep-
tion of neutral events rather than to investigate the estimation
of the duration of emotional events. We therefore showed our
participants validated emotional ﬁlms that lasted for long peri-
ods (9 min) in order to modify their general mood. Our results
demonstrated that viewing emotional ﬁlms for periods of several
FIGURE 4 | Superimposition of psychometric functions for fear.
Proportion of long responses plotted against probe durations divided by the
bisection point (BP) for the pre- and post-ﬁlm bisection task in the 200/400
and the 800/1600-ms duration range.
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minutes changed the participants’mood, and that the mood expe-
rience may affect the perception of time in a subsequent temporal
task. Three types of emotional ﬁlms were used: frightening, sad,
and neutral control ﬁlms. In line with other studies which have
used emotional ﬁlms (Rottenberg et al., 2007), our results showed
that viewing the frightening ﬁlms increased the participants’ feel-
ing of fear and their arousal level. In contrast, viewing sad ﬁlms
induced sadness and decreased the level of arousal, while viewing
neutral ﬁlms did not signiﬁcantly change the arousal dimension
or the discrete emotions. The participants were simply bored by
watching excerpts of TV weather or stock market news. However,
and more originally, our results showed that the mood elicited by
the ﬁlms affected time judgments in a subsequent temporal task
in which no emotional stimuli were present. The stimulus to be
timed was simply a blue circle of the type often used in studies of
time perception in humans. However, our results showed that the
perception of time was distorted only following the induction of
fear rather than of sadness.
Our study showed that themood of fear produced by the fright-
ening ﬁlms had a lengthening effect on time perception, with the
result that the stimulus durations were judged longer after than
before viewing these emotional ﬁlms. Indeed, our results indicated
that the psychometric functions were shifted toward the left in the
post-compared to the pre-ﬁlm bisection tasks, with a signiﬁcant
lowering of the BP being observed. In addition,our results demon-
strated that the fear-related effect on the perception of time was
not due to simply watching a ﬁlm, independently of the elicited
emotion. Indeed, the neutral ﬁlms did not affect time perception.
In sum, a clear distortion of time was produced by the mood of
fear induced by the ﬁlms. Furthermore, this time distortion was
not associated with an impairment of temporal discrimination.
Indeed, our ﬁndings showed that variability in time discrimi-
nation did not change between the experimental conditions as
indicated by the fact that the WR values were similar in the differ-
ent conditions. They also showed that Weber’s law holds whatever
the emotional condition, with a constant WR being observed for
the different stimulus duration ranges. Overall, these results are
entirely consistent with those found in temporal studies using
other negative highly arousing emotional stimuli (aversive sounds,
faces, pictures; for a recent review, see Droit-Volet, in press). As in
these earlier studies, we may thus assume that the lengthened time
experience observed in response to the frightening ﬁlms in our
study was due to the automatic activation of the nervous system
by the emotion of fear. Since the internal clock system depends on
the dynamic functioning of the brain, when its rate increases in
response to the emotion of fear, it producesmore time units for the
representation of time, and time is judged longer. In line with this
idea, our results suggested a signiﬁcant correlation between the
subjective individual feeling of being more nervous after viewing
the frightening ﬁlms, on the one hand, and the magnitude of the
lengthening effect,on the other. Themore nervous the participants
reported feeling after the frightening ﬁlms, the lower the associ-
ated BP values were. According to the mathematics of the internal
clock models, a clock rate-based mechanism requires a multiplica-
tive effect in which the magnitude of the temporal overestimation
is proportional to the duration values, i.e., it is greater for the long
than for the shorter stimulus durations. This is conﬁrmed by our
data that showed a larger leftward shift of the psychometric func-
tion in response to fear in the 400/1600 than in the 200/800-ms
duration conditions, and a greater difference between the BP val-
ues in the pre- and post-ﬁlm bisection tasks in the long than in the
shorter duration conditions. Furthermore, in the fear condition,
when the psychometric functions for the two duration ranges were
plotted against a relative scale (Probe durations/BP), they super-
imposed well. Overall, these different results support the idea that
viewing frightening ﬁlms speeds up the internal clock system and
consequently lengthens the experience of time.
Unlike the emotion of fear, sadness did not modify time per-
ception in the present bisection task despite the fact that the
participants reported being sadder and less aroused after than
before viewing the sad ﬁlms in the BMIS. The mood of sad-
ness is considered to be a low-arousal emotion inducing a slowing
down of mental and motor activity (Izard and Ackerman, 2000).
Consequently, on the basis of our results, we can suggest that
a low-arousal emotion, i.e., an emotion that is not arousing,
does not affect time perception. This is consistent with studies
of emotions that have found that the durations of low-arousal
stimuli were less overestimated that those of high arousal stim-
uli (Angrilli et al., 1997). Using negative low-arousal pictures
from the IAPS, Gil and Droit-Volet (submitted) recently found
that negative low-arousal pictures had few effect on time estima-
tion compared to neutral pictures. Nevertheless, we might have
expected that the decrease in arousal after the sad ﬁlm would
result in a slowing down of the internal clock system that, in turn,
would have shortened the perceived duration. It is possible that,
in our experiment, the magnitude of the decrease in arousal in
the participants when viewing the sad ﬁlms was insufﬁcient to
produce a signiﬁcant physiological slowing down of the inter-
nal clock system. This type of slowing down may be observed
to a greater extent during a major depressive episode associated
with a real loss of energy (Hoffer and Osmond, 1962; Wyrick and
Wyrick, 1977; Gil and Droit-Volet, 2009) or in response to the
administration of sedative drugs (e.g., Rammsayer, 1989; Lustig
and Meck, 2005). In a laboratory situation, it is therefore difﬁ-
cult to slow down the internal clock using external stimuli that
signiﬁcantly affect temporal behavior. Although several studies
have used periodic clicks to accelerate the internal clock with click
rates of between 5 and 25 Hz (Treisman et al., 1990; Ortega and
López, 2008; Wearden, 2008), none have successfully attempted
to slow down the internal clock by using lower click frequencies.
In addition, these click rate effects have been observed in “rela-
tive” conditions, in which the clock slows down after having been
accelerated, rather than in an “absolute” condition, i.e., following
the measurement of a baseline clock rate. In this latter condition,
Wearden (2008) was nevertheless able to manipulate the slow-
ing down of the internal clock by designing a particularly boring
experiment with long intervals between each trial. In these spe-
ciﬁc conditions, a signiﬁcant rightward shift of time estimates was
observed in the boring compared but to the non-boring exper-
iment in both a temporal generalization and a temporal verbal
estimation task but not in a temporal bisection task. In sum, it is
very difﬁculty, but not impossible, to slow down the general ner-
vous system and its internal clock by means of external emotional
stimuli.
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This difﬁculty in ﬁnding emotional stimuli that can slow down
the internal clock system is due to the fact that human beings are
genetically predisposed to produce automatic behavioral reactions
rather than to reduce their rate of action when events occur in the
environment. The motivation for action is thus one of the main
factors explaining the acceleration of the internal clock mecha-
nisms in response to emotion. Time distortions thus indirectly
allow us to identify the fundamental adaptive function of emo-
tions (Frijda, 1986). Fear is an emotional state of readiness for
action. As argued by Droit-Volet (in press), a threatening stimu-
lus triggers a cascade of physiological reactions: the pupils dilate,
the heart accelerates, blood pressure increases, the muscles con-
tract. The whole body is mobilized to react, i.e., to escape or to
attack as quickly as possible. Consequently, without disrupting
the processing of time, the internal clock runs faster, thus ensur-
ing that the individual is prepared to react earlier to incoming
events. In contrast, sadness is a poorly understood emotion, an
obscure emotion in Lazarus’ (1991) words. Its function is not
clearly identiﬁed, all the more so since it often co-exists along-
side other emotions (guilt, anger). In addition, the nature of the
feeling of sadness depends on its source (dull pain, grief, frustra-
tion, empathy with others), as well as on its intensity and duration,
with prolonged periods of sadness resulting in depression (Freed
and Mann, 2007). Nevertheless, sadness is thought to be“linked to
a loss, such as the death of someone we love, the failure of a cen-
tral life value or role, or the loss of the positive regard of another”
(Lazarus, 1991,p. 247). This loss therefore involves a certain degree
of disengagement. In line with this behavioral description of emo-
tions, neuroscientiﬁc studies using neuroimaging techniques have
shown a clear relationship between the emotion of fear, the amyg-
dala of the basal ganglia, and the dopaminergic system (LeDoux,
2005). The dopaminergic system is known to be involved in the
detection of incoming events that are potentially dangerous and
lead to a speciﬁc motor reaction. As Nieoullon and Coquerel
(2003) explained, Dopa is a gatekeeper allowing stimuli to access
high-order voluntary motor regions of the brain. More specif-
ically, as reported above, time judgments have been shown to
be highly sensitive to arousal effects and to the administration
of dopaminergic drugs. In contrast, except in the case of major
depression, little is known in the neuroscientiﬁc domain about
episodes of sadness lasting several minutes. In the case of sadness,
it seems that no speciﬁc neuroanatomical structures are involved,
although the induction of a sad mood seems to involve the ante-
rior cingulate cortex (Barrett, 2006; Freed and Mann, 2007). This
probably explains why sadness had no effect on time in the present
study. Whatever the case, the perception of time in the pres-
ence of sadness is particularly intriguing and various exploratory
experiments are now required in order to gain a better under-
standing of individuals’ relation to time in the emotional state of
sadness.
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